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Abstract 
This paper analyses the hypothesis that the robust relationship between trust – as measured by the 
World Values Survey’s question “In general, do you think that most people can be trusted, or that you 
can’t be too careful in dealing with people?” –  and economic growth,  established by empirical 
macroeconomic growth literature (Knack & Keefer, 1997; Zak & Knack, 2001; Beugelsdijk, de Groot, & 
van Schaik, 2004; Dearmon & Grier, 2009) in fact captures the well-functioning of institutions. 
Our results reveal that the correlation between trust and economic growth is robust in terms of 
statistical significance and sign of the estimated coefficient, when controling for the respondents’ 
perceived well-functioning of institutions. While underlining the existing empirical evidence that trust 
matters in explaining differences in economic performance, our results also show that this influence is 
largely independent of institutional well-functioning. 
JEL Classification: B40, O11, Z13 
Keywords: Trust, Institutions, Economic growth   
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The importance of social capital and implicit institutions to economic growth and development has 
increasingly been acknowledged by economists (see, for instance, the comprehensive volume edited by 
Ostrom & Ahn, 2003). While the idea that networks, trust and informal institutions heavily influence 
day-to-day life has been accentuated in other social sciences, at least, since the 1960s (see, for instance, 
Rosenberg, 1956; Granovetter, 1973) the widespread and intensive research currently (still) prevailing in 
economics, was triggered by the first systematic conzeptualization of the concept of social captial by 
James S. Coleman (1988) and the subsequent persuasive studies by Robert D. Putnam (1993) and Francis 
Fukuyama (1995).  
Trust is thereby seen as one of the most important dimensions (Fukuyama, 1995; Knack & Keefer,  1997; 
Zak & Knack, 2001; Uslaner, 2002). Societies with more trusting people are found to have less crime, 
better working democratic institutions, less corruption, and more open economies that are 
(additionally) growing at a faster rate. Fukuyama (1995) argues that complementary to a society’s 
endowment with traditional factors like capital and labor, a propensity to trust in other people, even 
without any prior acquaintance, constitutes an additional form of (social) capital fostering the success in 
economic competition. Trust between people reduces transaction costs and facilitates successful 
collective action (Ostrom & Ahn, 2003), thus contributing to the economic performance in advanced 
economies. 
On the empirical side various lines of research have tried to identify the role of trust on economic 
outcomes and economic behavior (for a critical review see, for instance, Durlauf, 2002). The seminal 
contributions linking trust to the macroeconomic growth literature stem from Knack & Keefer (1997), 
and Zak & Knack (2001). Using a cross-section of countries to determine the long-term economic payoff 
of social capital both find that generalized trust has a significant positive impact on economic growth. A 
number of further studies have refined and contributed to the understanding of the linkage between 
generalized trust and economic development on a macro-level, and the interaction of trust with other 
human and social capital (Beugelsdijk, de Groot, & van Schaik, 2004; Bjørnskov, 2005; Berggren, Elinder, 
& Jordahl, 2008;  Dearmon & Grier, 2009). Beugelsdijk, de Groot, & van Schaik  (2004) perform an 
extreme bounds analysis (Leamer, 1985)  on the data provided by Zak & Knack (2001), where the 
independent is the per capita GDP growth over the period from 1970 to 1992, and the core indepents 
consisting of the initial level of per capita GDP in 1970, schooling attainment in 1970, and the price of 
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ranging from black market premium, to the size of labor force to ethnolinguiostic fractionalization. 
Altogether they estimate 1540 equations, finding highly robust results for the positive correlation 
between economic growth and generalized trust. Dearmon & Grier (2009) find support for the trust-
growth relation using a panel of 51 countries. They additionally show that trust significantly interacts 
with both physical and human capital, applying a plethora of robustness checks.  
Berggren, Elinder, & Jordahl (2008) find that the correlation between trust and growth in cross-country 
analysis is sensitive to the estimator used and the number of observations included into the estimation.
1
All of these studies have in common that the empirical measure used to proxy trust is based on the 
question: “In general, do you think that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in 
dealing with people?” as proposed by Morris Rosenberg  in 1956. The actual values are taken from the 
World Values Survey (WVS) that contains extensive information on attitudes and norms of respondents 
in a large number of societies. Trust is measured as the percentage of persons replying “most people 
can be trusted” in each country. 
 
They, however, conclude that “[e]ven though trust may not be robustly related to growth, it could still 
be important to some degrees – and at least as important as many other ‘classic’ variables.” (Berggren, 
Elinder, & Jordahl, 2008: 267). 
However, the validity of this trust measure has been called into question by a number of recent 
publications (Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkamn, & Soutter, 2000; Miller & Mitamura, 2003; Beugeldijk, 2006; 
2008). Beugelsdijk (2006; 2008) argues that there is a mismatch between the theoretical argument, 
based in transaction cost theory, and the empirical operationalization of trust, based on the WVS’ 
“generally speaking…” question. He argues that the later does not measure trust between people but 
confidence in the well-functioning of institutions.
2
                                                           
1 The sensitivity of this relationship to the countries included in the estimation was already reported by Beugelsdijk 
(2006). 
  Following an argumention introduced by  Yamagishi 
& Yamagishi (1994), and Sapienza, Toldra, & Zingales (2007) of a distinction between trust as a cognitive 
bias (called benvolence-based trust) and the perception that the incentive structure deters the 
interaction partner from defecting (labled deterence-based trust), Beugelsdijk posits that the genralized 
trust measure corresponds to the later category. 
2 This is what we will call the Beugelsdijk hypothesis.  
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similar to Zak & Knack (2001), but additionally testing for the robustness of the trust measure when 
including variables that proxy the WVS’ respondents perception of the well-functioning of institutions. 
The rest of the paper is thus structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the trust measure as used in 
macroeconomic growth estimations. Section 3 provides an overview over the discussion on the 
generalized trust measure, specifically adressing the question of the long-term stability and the validity 
of the trust measure. Results are presented in Section 4, while the last section concludes. 
 
2.  The trust measure 
In most literature dealing with cross-country analysis, trust refers to the concept of generalized trust, 
which is to be distinguished from particularized trust. Whereas the latter describes the trust between 
people who know each other from either face-to-face interactions or via third parties, the prior 
describes its extensions to people of whom the trusting part has no direct information. Moreover, trust 
as understood in economics does not refer primarily to trusting behavior (Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkamn, 
& Soutter, 2000) but to the assessment of the trustworthiness of (relevant) others. 
Trustworthiness is an important motivation to engage in trusting behavior and an essential antecedent 
of trust in psychological theory (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995; Colquitt, Scott, & LePine, 2007), but 
is mediated by a number of trustor specific characteristics, such as the preference for risk, altruism, and 
reciprocity  (Sapienza, Toldra, & Zingales, 2007).  It entails the expectation that the other party will 
perform a certain action. Lewis and Weigert (1985: 970) note: 
First, trust is based on a cognitive process which discriminates among persons and institutions 
which are trustworthy, distrusted or unknown. In this sense we cognitively choose whom we will 
trust in which respects and under which circumstances, and we base the choice on what we take 
to be “good reasons”, constituting evidence of trustworthiness. 
In this understanding, trustworthiness follows from prior experiences with and the reputation of the 
potential trustee, or her characteristics. This view is very similar to game-theoretical concepts of 
reputation effects, and is thus understandable for most economists and political scientists, due to the 
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contained in a set of preferences.
3
However, decisions about trust often have to be made before enough time has passed to gather 
sufficient information on the trustworthiness of the other party. Julian Rotter (1967) was among the first 
to argue that trust may also be seen as a form of personality. He defined interpersonal trust as a form of 
generalized expectation that the words or promises of any given person could be relied on. This non-
experience-based ascription of trustworthiness to strangers has been referred to by other scholars as 
trust propensity (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995), dispositional trust (Kramer, 1999), generalized 
trust (Stack, 1978), and moralistic trust (Uslaner, 2002). Coleman (1988), Fukuyama (1995) and Uslaner 
(2002; 2008) extend the argument to social and ethical bases, argueing that trusting behavior towards 
strangers arises from a community’s shared „set of moral values in such a way as to create regular 
expectations of regular and honest behavior” (Fukuyama, 1995: 153). These values are learned early in 
life and passed on from parents to their children. Rice and Feldman (1997) find that values of different 
ethnic groups in the United States are highly correlated to the values in their countries of origin, even 
several generations after their families migrated to the US.  Uslaner  (2008)  extends this finding to 




In the macro-economic literature it is usually measured as the response to the question “In general, do 
you think that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?” The 
answer is a binomial choice between “most people can be trusted” and “can’t be too careful”, where 
the trust measure is given by the percentage or share of subjects in each country giving the prior reply. 
Starting from the seminal work of Morris Rosenberg (1956) this method of measurement has become 
the most widely employed survey questionnaire measure of trust in the social sciences. It is included in a 
considerable number of national and cross-national surveys, of which the most prominent is the World 
Values Survey.  
 
                                                           
3 A very comprehensive overview on the different views on the issue of trust can be found in the volume edited by 
Elias Khalil (2003). 
4 The linkage between experience-based and value-based trust is a matter of ongoing debate. Putnam’s (1993) 
idea that experience-based trust spills over into generalized trust via commitment in voluntary organizations has 
been disputed in recent studies (Claibourn & Martin, 2000;  Uslaner, 2002). However, there are numerous 
indications that trust propensity may alter the interpretation of others’ actions (Colquitt, Scott, & LePine, 2007), 
and that (conversely) personal experiences and the economic context influence the perceived trustworthiness of 
strangers (Uslaner, 2002). 
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The discussion on the measurement of generalized trust basically circles around two central 
assumptions. The first refers to the stability of the generalized trust measure over extended periods of 
time. The second, which has gained some attention recently, centers on the validity of the “generally 
speaking…” question. We will deal with both assumptions at a time, arguing that the assumption of 
time-invariance may be problematic, and testing the validity of the “generally speaking…” question. 
3.1 The stability of the trust measure 
From the difference between trust as taste or strategy and trust as trait follows that the prior, being 
based solely on personal experience, is rather fragile whereas the second, based on values, is highly 
stable over long periods of time. Given that the propensity to trust is learned in the formative years of 
early childhood it is reasonable to assume that such imprinting will significantly shape a person’s trust 
patterns. In an early study Katz and Rotter (1969) showed that 75 percent of the variation in trust values 
of college students could be explained by their parents’ trust values. Uslaner (2002) reports that across a 
series of panel surveys, ranging between 2 and 17 years, between 75 percent and 86 percent of the 
respondents gave consistent answers to the “generally speaking…” question. Additionally, given the 
results by Rice  and Feldman  (1997), and  Uslaner  (2004), cited in  the previous section,  it must be 
assumed that the propensity to trust is strongly influenced by cultural elements that are transmitted 
intergenerationally over extended periods of time. Bjørnskov (2005) argues that the propensity to trust 
must be in equilibrium at the level of society, as repeated misfits between expectations and behavior 
would lead an individual to eventually update her beliefs. As individuals act on their beliefs by 
reciprocating trust (cf. Guerra & Zizzo, 2004), such an equilibrium will probably turn out to be self-
enforcing. Under such circumstances beliefs will be confirmed by the behavior of others, and neither 
updating nor a change in behavior should occur. 
The long-term stability of generalized trust is especially important to economic literature, as it allows to 
assume that this societal feature is exogenous to economic development, and thus fit to be included in 
growth estimations inspired by the seminal work of Robert Barro (1991) (cf. Knack & Keefer, 1997; Zak & 
Knack, 2001; Beugelsdijk, de Groot, & van Schaik, 2004; Bjørnskov, 2005; Dearmon & Grier, 2009). As 
trust values are measured on a irregular basis, the stability assumptions allows infering that the values 
were the same prior to the period of observed economic development. 
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sciences only conjecture stable, but not immovable trust patterns. Eric M. Uslaner, using American 
National Election Survey data, observes that in the United States 
Trust is one of the most stable values, but it has fallen sharply from its high in the boom years of 
the 1960s. […] Trust has fallen from 58 percent in 1960, the first time the question appeared on 
a national survey, to about 36 percent in 1996. (Uslaner, 2002: 160) 
Thus, we have to acknowledge that even though generalized trust may be stable over some time it may 
nevertheless be subject to change. There are a number of reasons to believe that social trust can 
significantly change  over time. First, even if trust propensity is learned in early childhood and 
comparatively stable over a life-time, changes in the demographic composition  of a society could 
severely affect the trust value. Putnam (2000) shows that younger Americans are a lot less trusting than 
their older fellow citizens, indicating a cohort effect  on generalized trust levels. Additionally, as 
descendants of immigrants exhibit similar levels of trust as the current inhabitants of their country of 
origin (Rice and Feldman, 1997), migration, both to and from a country, may also alter trust patterns. 
Second, the ongoing globalization has repeatedly sparked concerns that the economic integration across 
national borders leads to processes of global value adaptation, undermining features such as trust or 
social cohesion (Bauman, 1998; Ritzer, 2004). The rationale here can be traced back to the equilibrium 
property of trust as proposed by Bjørnskov (2005). As globalization is characterized by an increasing 
international mobility (of labour, capital, etc.) and accelerating global social interactions, transactions 
between members of low-trust and high-trust societies become more and more likely, possibly 
functioning as a form of exogenous shock to both groups (Whalley, 2005). Third, there is increasing 
evidence that economic development may, as such, also exert an influence on the levels of generalized 
trust, indicating an endogenous process. In fact the strong correlation between trust and growth found 
in many studies could also be due to the fact that rich people can simply afford to trust, as defection 
may not have such devastating consequences for them as  for poorer  people.  This assumption is 
corroborated by micro-based findings that both a person’s real income and the median income of her 
area of living are positively correlated with the exhibited value of generalized trust (Alesina & La Ferrara, 
2000). Another robust result from most cross-country estimations is that economic inequality exerts a 
strong influence on the level trust (Zak & Knaack, 2001; Uslaner, 2002; Bjørnskov, 2005). 
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The results indeed suggest that there is a strong influence of the initial values of trust, and that there 
seems to be a negative influence of dramatic changes in policy. However, columns 2 to 4 indicate that 
the trust levels differ significantly between the waves. More explicitly it seems that in the second wave 
observed levels of trust were higher than for the consecutive waves, indicating a gradual decline in trust 
levels worldwide. This is consistent with observation by Putnam (2000) and Uslaner (2002) for the 
United States. 
 The dependent variable is the 
level of generalized trust which depending on data availability measured at each wave of the WVS, 
starting from the second time of measurement. Thus only countries are included who have been part of 
the WVS for at least two times (a total number of 70 countries). These values are regressed on the initial 
values of trust (as measured the first time the country took part in the WVS) and dummies for each 
wave. The table thus repeats the stability exercise by Volken (2002) and Bjørnskov (2005), but including 
the fifth wave of the WVS and applying panel estimates for the first time. Instead of adding, whether the 
country has been a part of the Warsaw Pact, we include a variable denoting if there has a appeared a 
major policy shift in the time between the first and the consecutive measurements, as indicated by the 
Polity IV data set (Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research, 2007). This is due to the fact that 
important changes, dismantling the entire system of society have not only taken place in the transitional 
economies, but also in South Africa, for instance. Thus considering policy change should give a more 
exhaustive impression. 




1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
OLS  OLS  FE  FE  OLS  FE  FE 
  Variables of interest       




    1.009*** 
(10.05) 































Second wave      0.056*** 
(2.97) 
    0.054*** 
(3.28) 
 
























Fifth wave    -0.066***    -0.056***  -0.056***    -0.054*** 
                                                           
5 The data base to these and the following exercises is comprehensively discussed in section 4. 
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Observations  175  175  175  175  76  76  76 
(Adj./overall) R²  .64  .66  .15  .15  .80  .11  .11 
F/Wald statistic  216.34  249.51  28.27  28.27  139.54  5.20  5.20 
a , dependent variable is the generalized trust value at the time of measurement  
b , all regressions include a constant term (t-values in parentheses); ***,  Significant at the 1% level; **,  Significant at the 5% 
level; *,  Significant at the 10% level 
 
Not for all countries in the sample the first observation coincides with the first wave and not all initial 
trust values stem from the early 1980ies. Hence, the results could be influenced by a sampling bias. 
Therefore columns 5 to 7 repeat the exercise including a subset of countries who were all included in 
the first wave of the WVS (a total number of 23 countries). While underlining the strong effect of initial 
trust values, and hence the stability of generalized trust values, it also emphasizes the fact that these 
values are not immovable. Between 64 percent and 80 percent of the variation is explained in the OLS 
estimation. However, if the effects are fixed across all countries these values drop to 15 percent and 11 
percent, respectively, underlining the strong effect of the initial values.  
In summary, it needs to be stressed, that the general assumption, most prevalent in economics, that the 
national trust scores are fixed across time does not hold if subjected to econometric scrutiny. However, 
the results indicate that changes taking place are small and probably slow. Compared to the influence of 
the initial trust values, the coefficients for the particular waves are, at best, less than one tenth in 
magnitude. Nevertheless, the results in Table 1 show that the national trust scores differ across the 
waves. To account for these differences we will refrain from using average growth rates over several 
decades, as is usually done in cross-country analysis (Knack & Keefer, 1997;  Zak & Knack, 2001; 
Beugelsdijk, de Groot, & van Schaik, 2004; Bjørnskov, 2005), and instead follow the example of Dearmon 
and Grier (2009) and use observation windows for each country and year in which the survey was 
conducted. This procedure entails the additional advantage that it increases the overall number of 
observations, as for each country this number increases from one to the number of surveys in which the 
country was included, such that the total number of observations n, increases from 𝑛 = 𝑖  to 𝑛 = 𝑖 × 𝑗, 
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The validity of the measurement of trust, as conducted by the “generally speaking…” question, has 
recently received growing attention in psychology and economics (Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkamn, & 
Soutter, 2000; Miller & Mitamura, 2003;  Beugeldijk, 2006; Sapienza, Toldra, & Zingales, 2007; Uslaner, 
2008;  Beugelsdijk, 2008). The cause of this discussion can be found in the ever-more fine grained 
differentiation of the concept of trust on the individual/firm level, where a plethora of types and 
typologies of trust were introduced in recent years (cf. Das & Teng, 2001).
6
Referring to a transaction cost reducing argument macro-economic literature, on the other hand usually 
applies the single concept of generalized trust, which has been introduced above. This form of trust is 
measured using the “generally speaking…” question. However, whether this question really measures 
trust propensity is still a question of debate and has sparked a heated argument in economics, amongst 
others, between Sjoerd Beugelsdijk and Eric M. Uslaner in the Cambridge Journal of Economics in 2008. 
 Calculus-based trust, for 
instance, derives from the trustor’s perception that the trustee will perform an action that is beneficial 
for the trustor. This perception can be motivated by a number of circumstances. In relational trust, it 
stems from repeated interactions, where reliability and dependability in past interactions, induce 
positive anticipations of the trustee’s intention (Rousseau, Sitkim, Burt, & Camerer, 1998). 
There is good reason to believe that the generalized trust question indeed measures average trust 
propensity in a society. The first thing to note is that this basic propensity, which is aquired in early 
childhood, has been established by a long and venerable tradition in developmental psychology (Rotter, 
1967; Stack, 1978; Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995; Kramer, 1999; Colquitt, Scott, & LePine, 2007). It 
refers to the generalized expectancy that others (independent of prior experiences) can be relied on, 
e.g. to honor their obligations, act and negotiate predictably and fair while faced with the opportunity to 
behave opportunistically (Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone, 1998). In the Pilot to American Nation Election 
Survey in 2000 a subsample of respondents were asked to take part in a ‘think aloud‘ experiments, 
requesting them to state what they thought the respective questions implied. 72% of those taking part 
in the experiment gave “general” responses to  the  “generally speaking…” question,  while only a 
minority refered to personal experiences or their personal environment (Uslaner, 2002: 72 et seq.). 
Knack and Keefer (1997) cite a study conducted by the Reader’s Digest in which wallets containing $50 
worth of cash, as well as the phone number and the address of the alleged owners were “accidentally” 
                                                           
6 There is also a special issue on the economic implications of trust on the firm/individual level in the Academy of 
Management Review, 1998, Vol. 23 (3). 
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correlated at 𝜌 = 0.67 with the World Values Survey “generally speaking…” question. It correlated much 
lower with a question assessing trust in family members, such that the “generally speaking…” question 
seems to capture a more generalized trust, as opposed to particularized trust in people whom one 
knows from repeated interactions. Sapienza, Toldra, & Zingales (2007), runing a modified version of the 
trust game (Berg, Dickhaut, & Kevin, 1995), find that the sender’s expectation of the trustworthiness of 
the receiver is highly correlated with the answer given to the generalized trust question (and a good 
predictor of the amount transferred in the first stage of the trust game). 
However, there are both methodological and theoretical problems that may impede the validity of the 
“generally speaking…” question. First, it has been repeatedly criticized that the wording of the trust item 
is somewhat ambiguous, especially with respect to the frame of reference respondents refer to when 
thinking about “people”  (Knack & Keefer, 1997;  Bjørnskov, 2005). While it may be clear that it is 
sufficient to ensure that this frame is extended beyond the vicinities of friends and family, it is less clear 
how much further it reaches (Hardin, 2002). Estimation results will be biased if the implications of “most 
people” differ systematically across societies (e.g. respondents in low-trust countries consider only 
persons they, at least infrequently, interact with, while respondents from high-trust countries consider 
indeed all people in their country or even in the world).
7 Second, Miller and Mitamura (2003) argue that 
the internal validity and interpretative meaning of the trust item, assessed by the WVS, may be severly 
obstructed due to systematic conflation of two different concepts. They hold that the survey question 
does not constitute a single scale, but matches two different discrete items. As the respondents can 
choose between “most people can be trusted” and “can’t be too careful”, they argue that the binomial 
choice is not trust and distrust, but trust and caution. The latter pair, however, can hardly be viewed as 
opposites.
8
                                                           
7 Putnam (2000: 137 et seq.) additionally argues that the responses to the “general speaking…” question are 
ambiguous with respect to the objectivity of change in peoples’ behavior. Note that it does not make a difference 
for the underlying argument if the level of honesty really changes or people become more paranoid (due to lurid 
media reports or for other reasons). As people can be expected to act on their beliefs, the perception of reduced 
levels of trustworthiness will lead to less trusting behavior (whether objectively justified or not), likewise reducing 
the perception of general trustworthiness by others. This should eventually shift the equilibrium to a new and 
lower trust value. 
 Experiments show that when trust is measured on a separate scale by removing caution, 
Americans exhibit higher levels of generalized trust than Japanese, which contradicts the results 
obtained from the WVS. Cross-country comparisons may then yield biased results if caution is more 
8 “[C]ertainly it is possible for a person to believe most people can be trusted, and at the same time believe that it 
is prudent to be cautious. It is reasonable, for example, to believe that the overwhelmingly majority of people will 
never try to burglarize one’s house, but still choose to lock one’s door.” (Miller & Mitamura, 2003: 63) 
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cultures (Weber & Hsee, 1998), which may put an additional bias on the estimated trust scores. 
Questions concerning the validity of the “generally speaking…” question also arise from a more 
theoretical point of view. Beugeldijk (2006; 2008) argues that the transaction cost reducing argument 
put forward in economics may not be as easily transferable from the micro to the macro level as is 
purported in the literature. His crituque refers only partially to the well-known problem of aggregation, 
which holds that the aggregation of individual behavior becomes a critical undertaking, once the 
population is not homogenous in the observed behavior (Hildenbrand, 2008). This implies that micro-
level constructs, like trust, cannot simply be aggregated over (highly) heterogenous populations, which 
is the case for generalized trust (Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkamn, & Soutter, 2000), assuming that the 
obtained macro-level value is still a valid representation of its individual-level counterpart (Morgeson & 
Hofmann, 1999). Dissecting the theoretical reasoning behind the seminal article by Knack and Keefer 
(1997), he goes on claiming that in the theoretical argumentation put forward by macro-economic 
literature there is an inconsistent leap from trust to confidence. Whereas the concept of trust refers to 
the transaction cost argument, as explicated above, the concept of confidence, as taken from Arrow 
(1972),
9
Beugelsdijk (2006: 376) thus suggests: 
 refers to the positive role of well-functioning institutions in economic development. 
that the question ‘Generally speaking, would you say most people can be trusted, or that you 
cannot be too careful in dealing with people?’ used in macro studies like those of Knack and 
Keefer (1997) and Zak and Knack (2001) is not the proper way to measure the degree of trust. 
[…] The fact that this question results in lower scores on trust in poorer countries than in richer 
countries does not imply that high levels of trust are important for economic development. It 
does not, for the simple reason that it does not do justice to the important distinction between 
micro and macro trust. Of these two types of trust, the WVS ‘generally speaking’ question 
comes closest to the latter one, macro trust. But given the theoretical reasoning […], a low score 
on this variable does not imply a lack of interpersonal trust in poor countries, but only shows the 
lack of well-functioning institutions. (italics added by Volland) 
                                                           
9 Arrow (1972: 360) discussing a book by Richard M. Titmuss (1971: The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to 
Social Policy, Pantheon Books, London ), argues that any “expression of impersonal altruism […] is not the richness 
of family relationships or the close ties of a small community […]. It is rather a diffuse expression of confidence by 
individuals in the workings of a society as a whole.” 
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behaving opprtunistically will be punished, i.e. how high the costs for defection are if a trustee decides 
to play a one-shot strategy. Given this reasoning a finder returns a stranger’s wallet intact because she 
fears legal prosecution or other social ostracism. When the functioning of institutions improves people 
may therefore risk exhibiting a higher willingness to be vulnerable (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995: 
712), because the improvement of institutions increases the chances of being convicted for - and hence 
the opportunity costs of - opportunistic behavior. The importance of well-functioning institutions, the 
security of property and contractual rights, and the efficiency of governements in providing public goods 
and creating government policies, have a long-standing tradition in the economics of development (cf. 
Olson, 1982; Weingast, 1997). North (1991: 54), for instance, holds that “the inability of societies to 
develop effective, low-cost enforcement of contracts is the most important source of both historical 
stagnation and contemporary underdevelopment in the Third World” because “the absence of secure 
property and contractual rights discourages investment and spezialization.” (Knack & Keefer, 2003: 56). 
Telling a story about the relationship between economic growth and generalized trust, would thus 
simply boil down to re-telling the story about the relationship between economic growth and well-
functioning institutions.
10
Beugelsdijk (2006) substantiates his argument that the macro-foundations of the trust measure are well-
functioning institutions, by a sequence of principal component analysises (PCA), showing strong links 
between government performance and generalized trust on a macro level. In fact, generalized trust 
loads strongly (0.8) on one dimension with variables describing quality of governance, amongst others 
contract enforceability (0.917), the rule of law (0.91), social infratsructre (0.936), and the Transperency 
International corruption index (0.925). However, as Uslaner (2008) points out, the analysis suffers from 
several shortcomings. First, excluding relevant cases by restricting the analysis to Europe, necessarily 
introduces a selection bias. Second, the restricted number of observations (41 societies) and the 
comparatively high number of variables (18), results in only 2.3 observations per manifest  variable 
invoking an issue of insufficient degrees of freedom.
 
11
                                                           
10  Several authors (cf. Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994; Sapienza, Toldra, & Zingales, 2007) have suggested a 
distinction between two different types of trust. One is based on “deterence” and thus corresponds to the well-
functioning of institutions and the other is based on “benevolence” and thus corresponds to the general cognitive 
bias described above. The essence of Beugelsdijk’s critique is the argument that the “generally speaking…” 
question measures only the prior form of trust. 
 Recently, Peres-Neto, Jackson, and Somers (2005) 
conducted an extensive simulation study, showing that the results of different PCA approaches are 
11 In order to avoid computational difficulties, the general rule of thumb usually referred to in the literature 
specifies between 5 and 10 observations per variable as a bare minimum, (cf. Burstyn, 2004; Uslaner, 2008). 
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shows that the power of a PCA depends inversely on the number of observations. Additionally, the 
eigenvalues of the covariance matrix are affected by the number of observations, in a way that the 
eigenvalues increase with decreasing observations  (Watkins).  Thus, the eigenvalues obtained  from 
Beugelsdijk’s analysis may also be biased due to the low number of observations. Hence, even if one 
buys into the argumentation put forth by Beugelsdijk  (2006; 2008), there may be serious doubt 
concerning the results of the statistical analysis presented.  
 
4.  Data and EmpiricsWe will try to test Beugelsdijk’s hypothesis applying a classical econometric 
approach. We will therefore run Barro-type growth estimations including both generalized trust and 
proxies for the well-functioning of institutions. Our approach is thus comparable to most cross-country 
analysis since the seminal work by Knack and Keefer (1997). It is similar to the approach by Zak and 
Knack (2001), however using a larger and more balanced data set and a panel of countries. Additionally, 
we derive the proxies for the well-functioning of institutions from the same data set than our trust 
values (hence, the WVS), and thus do not have to employ data from other surveys, like the Business 
Environmental Risk Intelligence or the International Country Risk Guide, based on (potentially) different 
samples. Since, in our approach, the same subjects answer on both the trust and well-functioning of 
institutions questions, we minimize problems arising from systematic differences between the data sets. 
Aside from the WVS, the main datasets used in our empirical analysis are the Penn World Tables, version 
6.3 (Heston, Summers, & Aten, 2009) and The World Bank’s World Development Indicators and Global 
Development Finance (The World Bank, 2010). Additionally we obtained average years of schooling from 
Barro and Lee (1993) and enrollment rates for primary, secondary and tertiary education from various 
issues of the UNESCO’s Statistical Yearbook (before 2000) and the Education Digest (after 2000). Some 
data were additionally added from the Historical Data Files of the International Macroeconomic Data Set 
(US States Department of Agriculture, 2010), the Total Economy Database (Conference Board, 2010), the 
External Wealth of Nations  Mark  II  (Lane & Milesi-Ferretti, 2007), the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict 
Dataset, version 4-2009 (Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, 2008), the 
Polity IV: Regime Authority Characteristics and Transitions Datasets, version 2007 (Integrated Network 
for Societal Conflict Research, 2007), and various versions of the CIA’s World Factbook. Finally, ethnic 
fractionalization  of countries was taken from Fearon  (2003)  and Roeder (2001),  and religious 
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Charron, Samanni, Holmberg, & Rothstein, 2009). 
 Following Dearmon and Grier (2009) we will use observation windows for each WVS country/wave. We 
thereby pay tribute to the finding that generalized trust values are not time-invariant, but subject to 
change. While results presented in section 3.1 suggest not to treat generalized trust as a fixed value over 
extended periods of time, they also emphasize that it is nevertheless save to assume that these values 
change at best marginally over short time periods. Thus, similar to the studies that have been conducted 
since the seminal work of Knack and Keefer (1997), our dependent is the average growth rate of a 
country in a period ranging from four years prior to the observation to four years after the WVS-
observation. Thus if the WVS was conducted in country 𝑖 in 1991, the observation window will cover the 
period from 1987 to 1995.
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 Independent variables are taken either as averages over the same period 
or, depending on pending problems of endogeneity, in the year prior to the first year of the observation 
window. WVS data are the limiting factors in terms of observations and countries. We obtain a total of 
277 observations, stretched over a period from 1981 to 2009. 
4.1. Trust and well-functioning institutions 
We obtain the trust value as the share of people in each country answering “most people can be 
trusted” to the dichotomous “generally speaking…” question in the combined European and World 
Values Survey, including all five waves conducted between  1981  and 2009, and corresponding to 
355,298 individual cases from 98 world societies. Values range from a low of 0.028 in Brazil in 1997 to a 
high of 0.741 in Norway in 2007. The surveys include between 393 (Malta, 1991) to 6,025 (Colombia, 
1999) respondents, designed to be nationally representative samples. 27 additional observations were 
taken from the Life in Transition Survey (LITS) conducted by the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) that asked the same “generally speaking…” question.  
We employ three different proxies of the well-functioning of institutions. These proxies are derived from 
a set of questions, aimed to access the subject’s confidence in various organizations and institutions, 
                                                           
12 Note that estimating growth models using a panel approach and (shortened) observation windows, generally 
leads to similar results than in cross-country analysis (Grier & Tullock, 1989; Islam, 1995; Dawson, 1998; Dearmon 
& Grier, 2009). To control for possible effects of endogeneity the analysis were also conducted using an 
observation window reduced to the four years following the WVS-observation, leading to similar results. 
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the government or the presidency. The question is phrased: “I am going to name a number of 
organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal 
of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all?” The answer is coded 
from 1 (a great deal of confidence) to 4 (none at all). We will concentrate on the items “The Police”, 
“The Justice System”, and “The Civil Services” as they represent the major institutions assuring and 
enforcing contractual and property rights, and are closely connected to the efficiency of government. To 
generate comparable values we estimated the share of people who answered that they had a great deal 
or some confidence in the relevant institutions. A forth measure that  assesses the  (subjective 
impression on the)  extent of political corruption, was taken from Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI). It is obtained from a minimum of three surveys per country that ask 
for the perceptions on the degree of corruption in each country by businessmen, risk analysts and the 
general public (Graf Lambsdorff, 2000). Values range from 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (highly clean). 
13
For a number of reasons, we believe that these subjective assessments of institutional well-functioning 
are better suited for the purpose of this contribution than alternative (objective) measures like the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) used by other studies (cf. Zak & Knack, 2001). First, it assesses 
institutional well-functioning from the same sample as generalized trust, and thus minimizes problems 
arising from systematic differences between the data sets. Second, Beugelsdijk (2006; 2008) argues that 
trust as assessed by the “generally speaking…” question is simply a proxy for the well-functioning of 
institutions, and may say nothing about the trust between people, even in so-called “low-trust” 
countries. However, from his line of argument it becomes apparent that it is less the well-functioning of 
institutions, per se, but rather the people’s confidence in well-functioning of institutions.
 As 
the CPI was surveyed for the first time in 1995 we have to extrapolate the corruption values for earlier 
country/year averages from the first available estimate.  
14
                                                           
13 Note, that the perceived prevalence of political corruption was assessed by the WVS in the 3
rd wave (1994-1999) 
only. Thus the number of observations is limited to 51 country/wave values. In the WVS the prevalence of 
corruption was assessed by the following question: “How widespread do you think bride taking and corruption is in 
this country?” Potential values range from 1 (Almost no public officials engaged in it) to 4 (Almost all public officials 
are engaged in it). A comparison of the CPI values with the aggregated corruption assessment from the WVS 
reveals that both values are highly correlated (𝑛 = 51; 𝜌 = 0.9025). In order to preserve the panel structure of 
our data and the high number of observations employing CPI values as a proxy for the perception of the 
prevalence of corruption seems justified. 
 It is evident 
that whereas the prior might be better measured by objective criteria, as for instance applied in the 
14 See also the quote from Arrow (1972) in footnote 9. 
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am wrongly or correctly under the impression that the legal system and its executive organs are 
unwilling or unable to defend my property or prosecute others who have wronged me. 
Table 2 gives some descriptive statistics on the four measures of institutional well-functioning. It is 
apparent that a higher amount of people express confidence in public institutions, like the legal system 
and the police than is given by the generalized trust measure. Additionally, the standard deviation of all 
measures of institutional well-functioning is bigger than for the generalized trust question, indicating a 
greater volatility in these measures than in generalized trust.  
Table 2. Descriptives for the WVS Trust and Confidence Measures 
 
Name 
1  2  3  4  5 
Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum  Maximum  Observations 
Generalized trust  0.3076103  0.1520799  0.0280456  0.7416503  277 
Confidence in Police  0.5584045  0.1967426  0.127551  0.932377  265 
Confidence in Justice 
System 
0.5081973  0.1723109  0.0815627  0.9031359  231 
Confidence in Civil Services  0.4548692  0.1662355  0.0582121  0.959596  237 
Perception of Corruption  4.967316  2.416118  0.69  10  272 
Source: European and World values Survey, Life in Transition Survey, Transparency International Corruption Perception Index 
 
A more reliable, indication on the link between generalized trust and confidence in the well-functioning 
of institutions can be obtained from looking at the correlation structure.  Figure 1 to Figure 4 present 
the correlation between generalized trust and confidence in the respective institutions for all four 
measures. 
Insert Figures 1 to 4 here 
The number of observations and Pearson’s product-moment correlation coefficient (rho) are given on 
the bottom right-side of the plot area. The correlation coefficients range between 𝜌 = 0.0306  for 
confidence in the civil services to 𝜌 = 0.5583 for confidence in the police. Especially prevalence of 
corruption and confidence in the police are strongly correlated with generalized trust supporting the 
argument put forward by Beugelsdijk  (2006; 2008). In order to see whether there were apparent 
differences between countries, depending on their status of development, observations were divided 
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Classification from 2000 (World Bank, 2004). However, while high-income countries exhibit, on average, 
higher trust and higher confidence values, the linkage between trust and confidence in institutions 
seems to differ only in the case of corruption. While for high income countries the correlation between 
generalized trust and corruption is high and positive (𝜌 = 0.6876), suggesting a link between trust and 
corruption, the same value is low and negative for low and middle income countries (𝜌 = −0.1917 for 
low income countries and 𝜌 = −0.2268 for middle income countries). Thus, if we posit a causal link 
from corruption to trust (as it is, for instance, suggested by Zak and Knack (2001), and Bjørnskov (2005)) 
the effect is different for developing and developed countries. Whereas trust decreases with corruption 
in highly developed countries, it has little to no effect in developing economies. The reasons therefore 
may me plentiful. First, high-trust equilibria may simple be more fragile than low-trust equilibria, i.e. if I 
already distrust the people around me, the marginal effects of corruption on my perception of other’s 
trustworthiness may be small to non-exsistent. On the other hand, given that the correlation for 
developing countries is negative, another explanation may be warranted. If corruption is high, people 
with insufficient funding to bribe officials may have to cooperate more closely with fellow citizens in 




4.2. Trust, Investment and Growth 
While regressing generalized trust on institutional well-functioning shows robust correlations between 
trust and well-functioning institutions at the macro level (cf. Zak & Knack, 2001; Bjørnskov, 2005) it is, 
nevertheless, insuffiecient to test the “Beugelsdijk-hypothesis” that there may be a mismatch between 
theoretical reasoning and the empirical operationalisation of trust. In fact, including formal institutions 
in such an estimation rasises the variation explained only by six to nine percent compared to a base 
model containing GDP, average schooling, and a property rights index (Zak & Knack, 2001). Instead of 
trying to estimate the effects of formal institutions on generalized trust we will therefore estimate the 
effects of these measures on economic growth. The rationale behind this estimation strategy is simply 
that  if generalized trust (as measured by the “generally speaking…” question) indeed assesses the 
perceived well-functioning of institutions, including additional variables accounting for the same quality 
should introduce high levels of multicollinearity, canceling the signifcance of the highly correlated 
                                                           
15 Note, that a similar argument on the development of trust due to “forced” cooperation is made by Dudley 
(2010) for the case of the invention of general purpose technologies during the industrial revolution.  
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institutional well-functioning, not correlated (highly) to each single institutional measure, adding its 
components to the estimation should both alter the size of the coefficient and eventually render the 
variable insignificant in favor of its better fitting components. 
We thus run Barro-type growth regressions, where the dependent is the annual average growth rate in 
the observation window. The specification of the base model corresponds to the one by Zak and Knack 
(2001) and Beugelsdijk, de Groot, & van Schaik (2004) with the independent variables being the real 
GDP per capita (from Heston, Summers, & Aten, 2009) in the year prior to the observation window, 
average schooling attainment (mean years of schooling for the population aged 25 and older) from 
Barro and Lee (1993), and the price of investment goods relative to US prices (Heston, Summers, & Aten, 
2009) for the same year. Additionally it contains the trust value. Wave-dummies are included to control 
for global economic phenomena like the oil crises in the late 1970s and early 1980s, or the dot-com 
bubble in the late 1990s and its subsequent stock market crash in the early 2000s. 
To investigate whether the obtained estimates deviate in size or robustness from the ones obtained by 
standard cross-country analysis we include a number of control variables. The controls largely 
correspond to the ones that have been employed in growth estimations so far (Barro, 1991; Sala-i-
Martin, 1997; Knack & Keefer, 1997; Zak & Knack, 2001; Beugelsdijk, de Groot, & van Schaik, 2004; 
Bjørnskov, 2005). They include openness of the economy to trade, the size of the population (in millions 
of people), the average life expectancy in years, the size of the rural population, the share of industry 
and agriculture in value added, military expenditures, per capita energy use, fuel exports as % of total 
exports, ore and metal exports as % of total exports, the external wealth of the country (in bilions of US 
$), and the political stability of the country. Values for all these variables were taken from the year 
preceeding the first year of the observation window. The share of investment in GDP, the real interest 
rate, the growth of the real exchange rate to the US $, and the democracy score were taken as annual 
averages over the observation period. Time-invariant variables included the land-surface area (in 
𝑘𝑚² × 10³), the average latitutde of a country, a dummy denoting membership in the Commonwealth 
of Nations/ former British colony, and a dummy for access to international waters. Other dummies code 
whether the country was a member of the European Union or its predecessors at any time in the 
observation window, the intensity of any armed conflict, both in and up to 15 years before the 
observation period. Ethnic fractionalization and the fraction of different religions and denominations in 
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 A complete list of 
variables including a description and information on the sources can be found in the Appendix.  
5.  Results 
5.1. Comparability of cross-section and panel data 
Table 3 presents the results for the baseline model and the robustness checks. To ensure sufficient 
degrees of freedom three to four variables were included at a time. All estimations were conducted 
using OLS and random effects panel estimation.
17
Insert Table 3 here 
 As the signs, coefficients, and p-values are similar, we 
report OLS estimates only for the baseline model. 
The estimates obtained from Table 3 are largely similar to the ones from prior cross-country estimations 
( cf. Barro, 1991; Knack & Keefer, 1997; Zak & Knack, 2001; Beugelsdijk, de Groot, & van Schaik, 2004) 
and therefore do not require extended discussion. Columns (1) and (2) report the estimates from the 
baseline model. Contrary to standard cross-country results the sign of schooling is positive in all 
estimations. Berggren, Elinder, & Jordahl (2008) show that even in cross-country estimation the sign for 
schooling becomes positive when estimated over a later time sample. This may be due to the fact that 
most of the countries added in the later waves of the WVS were (developing) countries, like Mali, with 
low average schooling.  However, given that the coefficient is significant in only five out of 12 
                                                           
16 As in most countries censuses are few and far between these numbers are extrapolated from the closest existing 
estimation obtained from the various sources. 
17 Note, that we additionally conducted fixed effects estimation (excluding the wave dummies), due to the fact that 
a number of Hausman tests (1978) revealed a possible bias in the random effects estimates. However, although 
the size of the coefficients differed in fixed effects estimation, the signs were identically in almost all estimations, 
suggesting robust results from our reported random effects estimators. We do not report fixed effects estimation, 
here, due to two basic reasons. First, fixed-effects estimators are known to become very inefficient when applied 
with slowly changing regressors, as the fixed effect will “soak up” most of the explanatory power of these 
variables, making it hard for them to appear either substantively or statistically significant (Beck, 2001; Plümper & 
Troeger, 2007). Since it was established in section 3.1 that generalized trust changes only slowly over time, using 
unit fixed effects seems unwarranted. Second, fixed effects are run to calculate within subject effects. We are, 
however, also interested in the between effects of trust and confidence on countries’ economic growth. We report 
the median theta values for each RE-estimation. It is defined as 𝜃 = 1 − �𝜎𝑒
2 (𝑇 × 𝜎𝑢
2 + 𝜎𝑒
2) ⁄  with 𝑇 = 1,…,𝑡 
denoting the number of waves, 𝜎𝑢
2 the variance between the countries, and 𝜎𝑒
2 the variance within the countries. If 
theta tends to 0 the variance within the countries is much larger than the variance between the countries. In such 
a case RE estimates will be substantially biased. However, median theta values reported exceed .6 in most 
estimations, lending additional credit to our RE-models. 
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(negative) relationship between growth and the price of investment goods relative to US prices usually 
reported in cross-country literature.  
Of the local and regional variables only the size of the population is signifcantly correlated with growth, 
which could be due to either a correpsonding larger labor force or owed to a larger internal demand. 
Comparable to most cross-country findings (cf.  Sala-i-Martin, 1997) the (significant) coefficient of 
openness indicates that growth is higher in countries with a higher share of exports and imports in 
GDP.
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Given that the relationship of growth and the share of investment in GDP is one of the most stable in 
economic growth accounting (cf. Sala-i-Martin, 1997; Beugelsdijk, de Groot, & van Schaik, 2004) our 
finding in equation (6) is not too surprising. The same equation shows that higher military expenditures 
are, on average, accompanied by significantly lower growth rates, which corresponds to frequent 
findings in cross-country growth literature (Ram, 1995; Aizenman & Glick, 2006). We also find that the 
structure of the industrial base matters, as countries with a higher share of services in value added, also 
exhibit higher rates of growth (Column (7)).  
 Note, that including a dummy for countries belonging to the European Union or its predecessor 
organizations considerably reduces the coefficient of generalized trust. Given that the EU dummy 
removes all the variation from European countries from the estimation, it raises the question whether 
general trust is as relevant to economic growth in developing countries. While our results point to a 
larger impact of trust on developed economies’ growth, Knack & Keefer (1997) find that trust has the 
largest impact on developing countries, and Dearmon & Grier (2009) find no significant differences 
between those two.  
None of the political variables in our estimation (Columns (9) and (10)) were found to correlate 
signifcantly with growth. The only exception is whether the country experienced a considerbale policy  
shift during the period of observation. Most of the country/wage observations that fall into this category 
are related to countries formerly belonging to the  Warsaw Pact. Hence, the break-down of the 
economies in Eastern Europe following the end of communist rule is mirrored in this estimate.  
                                                           
18 Note, that we employ a different measure of openness than Sala-i-Martin (1997) or Beugelsdijk, de Groot, & van 
Schaik (2004). 
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share of different  religions and denominations, and economic growth  (cf.  Sala-i-Martin, 1997).
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Caution is advised, however, when interpreting these results as none of them were checked for 
robustness by controlling for additional variables. On the other hand, the most robust estimates in this 
exercise are the ones for initial GDP per capita  and for generalized trust. The fact that growth is on 
average smaller where initial GDP is already high is one of the most robust results from the growth 
estimation literature (Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 2004). The significant positive correlation between trust 
and growth replicates the results from most studies probing into the linkage between trust and 
economic development (cf. Knack & Keefer, 1997; Zak & Knack, 2001; Beugelsdijk, de Groot, & van 
Schaik, 2004; Dearmon & Grier, 2009).
 
However, unlike the standard results we find no significant linkage between growth and Protestantism. 
Positive correlations exist between growth and the share of Catholics and Confucians, and a negative 
correlation with the share of Muslims in a country. As the only countries with substantial shares of 
Confucians can be found in East-Asia (China, Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore) the large 





 In the case of generalized trust even the size of the coefficients 
matches the prior results.  As the estimations from our panel robustly replicate prior results from cross-
section and panel estimation, we may conclude that our specification captures the relationship between 
generalized trust and growth similar to the specifications on which Beugelsdijk’s critique is based.   
3.1. The Beugesldijk hypothesis 
Given that we have found a robust positive correlation between economic growth and generalized trust, 
we will now go on to probe into the linkage between growth, trust and confidence in the well-
functioning of institutions. Table 4 presents the results from a series of estimations based on the same 
baseline model as in the previous exercise.  
                                                           
19 Max Weber’s ground-breaking work in the article “Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus” was 
first published in “Archiv für Sozialwissenschaften und Sozialpolitik“ in 1904 (Vol. 20) and 1905 (Vol. 21). For a 
more recent discussion in economics cf. (Guiso, Sapienza, & Zingales, 2003). 
20 The studies by Berggren, Elinder, & Jordahl (2008), and Beugelsdijk (2006), who show that the signifcance and 
the size of the coefficient are sensitive to the number of countries included in the regression, are execptions to 
that point.  
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Columns (1) to (4) present estimations were each of the variables measuring well-functioning 
institutions were separately added, to see whether any of these variables already had an influence on 
the size, sign or significance of the generalized trust coefficient. However, neither the sign nor the alpha-
error probability of the trust coefficient changes substantially. While we find no statistically significant 
correlation between growth and confidence in the police, and growth and confidence in civil services, 
the linkages of growth to both confidence in the legal system and the perception of corruption are 
significant at the 5% level. Economic growth is higher, where (perceived) corruption is lower. This result 
is in line with a stream of (theoretical and empirical) literature, arguing that corruption is detrimental to 
economic growth, as it essentially constitutes an additional tax on business transactions and raises 
barriers to market entry by excluding those that lack the necessary funding to bribe officials (Murphy, 
Shleifer, & Vishny, 1993; Mauro, 1995; Mo, 2001).
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What is however surprising is the negative coefficient of confidence in the legal system. Accepting the 
size of the coefficient, this would imply that an increase of one percent of people claiming to have at 
least some trust in their country’s justice system is, on average, accompanied by a decrease in growth of 
.02 percentage points.  
 
The fact that the correlation between trust and growth remains unchanged in the first four estimations 
could be due to the fact that neither of the four confidence variables captures the well-functioning of 
institutions, alone. In fact, it can easily be argued that “the well-functioning of institutions” is a complex 
phenomenon and is constituted by efficient governance and reliable protection and enforcement of 
property rights. An indication therefore is the volatility of the generalized trust coefficient in absolute 
terms between the first four estimations, with the largest value exceeding the smallest by almost 40 
percent. We thus include all four variables simultaneously in estimation (5). The result, however, 
confirms the findings from the previous estimations. An analysis of the variance inflation factors from 
the OLS estimation  reveals the presence of potentially problematic multicollinearity in the data,
22
                                                           
21  The opposing school of thought emphasizes the beneficial effects of corruption on growth -  especially in 
developing economies – maintaining that corruption introduces efficiency in the economy, amongst others, by 
avoiding bureaucratic delay and reducing uncertainty (Leff, 1964; Acemoglu & Verdier, 1998). 
 
reducing but not deleting the significance of the generalized trust measure. To check how much the 
results are driven by correlation between the confidence variables, we conduct a principal component 
22 The largest VIF reaches a value of 4.67 which is identical to a tolerance level below the threshold of .25, given in 
the literature (O'Brien, 2007). 
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eigenvalue exceeding the threshold of one are identified. Eigenvalues are plotted in Figure 5 and factor 
loadings are given in Table 5.
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Insert Figure 5 here 
 
Table 5. Principal Component Analysis of Confidence Measures 
 
Name 
1  2  3 
Factor 1  Factor 2  Unexplained Variance 
Confidence in Police  0.5805  0.2205  0.1159 
Confidence in Justice 
System 
0.5536  -0.2537  0.1753 
Confidence in Civil Services  0.4242  -0.6478  0.1243 
Perception of Corruption  0.4202  0.6837  .08372 
Source: European and World values Survey, Life in Transition Survey, Transparency International Corruption Perception Index 
 
The factors obtained from the PCA substituted the original variables in a subsequent estimation (Column 
(6)), yielding however no different results from the previous estimation. 
Given that the generalized trust measure is derived from the WVS’ “generally speaking…” question, the 
results obtained are inconsistent with the Beugelsdijk hypothesis of a match between the answering 
behavior to this question and the well-functioning institutions. 
 
4.  Conclusions 
In this contribution, we have evaluated what we call the Beugelsdijk hypothesis, applying Barro-type 
growth estimations to a panel of countries. The Beugelsdijk hypothesis is derived from a discussion 
between Sjoerd Beugelsdijk (2006; 2008) and Eric M. Uslaner (2008) as presented in the Cambridge 
Journal of Economics (Vol. 32). It holds that there is a mismatch between economic theorizing and 
empirical operationalization of the concept of trust, using aggregated answers from the World Values 
Survey’s “generally speaking…” question. It further posits that this item corresponds to the well-
functioning of institutions instead, claiming that it rather reflects the respondent’s perception of the 
                                                           
23  A Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin test (overall KMO: 0.62) revealed only miserable to mediocre sampling adequacy, 
indicating that the variables have too little in common to warrant a PCA. As the results from the PCA are simply 
used for a last check on the robustness of the results we proceed, nevertheless, with the estimation. 
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from defecting,  than a cognitive bias or propensity to accredit strangers with a certain level of general 
trustworthiness. 
Our results reveal that the correlation between trust and economic growth is robust in terms of 
statistical significance and sign of the estimated coefficient, when controling for the respondents’ 
perceived well-functioning of institutions. These results are inconsistent with the Beugelsdijk hypothesis, 
and lend credit to validity of proxying trust by the WVS’ “generally speaking…” question, common in the 
economic growth literature. While trust may  indeed consist of two components –  one based on 
benevolence and the other on deterence (Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994; Sapienza, Toldra, & Zingales, 
2007) – the values taken from the WVS do not correspond to the latter category. Our overall conclusion 
is that, while the well-functioning of public institutions is an important aspect in explaining differences in 
economic development (cf. Grier & Tullock, 1989; Islam, 1995; Sala-i-Martin, 1997), it does not capture 
the whole picture. Especially, it does not explain  the influences of generalized trust on economic 
development. We therefore add further empirical evidence to the literature that trust propensity 
matters for explaining variations in economic growth. 
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Figure 1. Correlation between Generalized Trust and Confidence in Police 
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Source: European and World Values Survey 1981-2009; Life in Transition Survey, 2006 
 
Figure 2. Correlation between Generalized Trust and Confidence in the Justice System 
a 
 a , The differentiation between Low-, Middle- and High-Income Countries follows the World Bank List of Economies (April 2010) 
Source: European and World Values Survey 1981-2009; Life in Transition Survey, 2006 
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Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 080Figure 3. Correlation between Generalized Trust and Confidence in Civil Services 
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a , The differentiation between Low-, Middle- and High-Income Countries follows the World Bank List of Economies (April 2010) 
Source: European and World Values Survey 1981-2009; Life in Transition Survey, 2006 
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a , The differentiation between Low-, Middle- and High-Income Countries follows the World Bank List of Economies (April 2010) 
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Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 080Figure 5. Eigenvalues of Principal Component Analysis 
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 a , Variables include Confidence in Police, Confidence in Legal System, Confidence in Civil Services, Perception of Corruption 
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  Controls         
Area      -.0001 
(.0002) 
   
Population      .0034* 
(.002) 
   
Rural Population      -.0228 
(.0247) 
   
Life expectancy        -.0095 
(.1076) 
 
Energy use        -.0001 
(.0001) 
 
Latitude        .0231 
(.0239) 
 
Openness          .0098* 
(.0054) 
International Waters          .5821 
(1.0268) 
EU          .9928*** 
(.3068) 
Commonwealth          .4833 
(.8507) 
Wave dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  220  220  216  213  212 
Adj. R²  0.25         
overall R²    0.21  0.26  0.22  0.25 
F/Wald statistic  7.93  83.84  93.22  95.97  119.99 
𝜽 median    0.6282  0.618  0.6484  0.6591 
a , dependent variable is the growth rate of real GDP  
b , all regressions include a constant term (White-corrected standard errors  in parentheses); ***,  Significant at the 1% level; **,  
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  Controls       
Military expenditure  -.4348*** 
(.1552) 
     
Investment  .1313*** 
(.0467) 
     
Primary  -.0017 
(0.0159) 
     
Agriculture    -.1904*** 
(.0485) 
   
Industry    -.1074*** 
(.0367) 
   
Fuel exports    .0181 
(.0148) 
   
Ore and metal exports    .0169 
(.0537) 
   
External Wealth      -.0003 
(.0004) 
 


















      .0553 
(.0507) 
Wave dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  149  196  170  213 
Adj. R²         
overall R²  0.42  0.2  0.31  0.22 
F/Wald statistic  93.78  94.9  82.43  95.97 
𝜽 median  0.6011  0.6354  0.7008  0.6484 
a , dependent variable is the growth rate of real GDP  
b , all regressions include a constant term (White-corrected standard errors  in parentheses); ***,  Significant at the 1% level; **,  
Significant at the 5% level; *,  Significant at the 10% level 
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  Controls     
Pre-War  -.0630 
(.4258) 
   
In-War  -.5209 
(.3642) 
   
Ethnic  -1.4416 
(1.1376) 
   
Catholic    1.4239* 
(.8296) 
 
Confucian    8.5071*** 
(3.3204) 
 
Hindu    3.0033 
(1.8367) 
 
Protestant      .0295 
(.0288) 
Muslim      -2.3199** 
(.8988) 
Orthodox      -3.4699 
(2.1395) 
Wave dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  219  220  220 
Adj. R²       
overall R²  0.24  0.28  0.25 
F/Wald statistic  102.08  93.22  98.69 
𝜽 median  0.6229  0.6177  0.6292 
a , dependent variable is the growth rate of real GDP  
b , all regressions include a constant term (White-corrected standard errors  in parentheses); ***,  Significant at the 1% level; **,  
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  Variables of Interest         
Confidence in Police  0.5238 
(1.3876) 
      2.4332 
(1.7218) 
 
Confidence in Legal System    -2.4286** 
(1.1956) 
    -2.5688 
(1.8088) 
 
Confidence in Civil Services      -1.1772 
(1.1542) 
  -1.0807 
(1.6841) 
 





Factor 1            .2844 
(.1743) 
Factor 2            .4105 
(.2705) 
Wave dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  210  186  201  219  172  172 
overall R²  0.22  0.26  0.14  0.22  0.2  0.19 
Wald statistic  85.41  91.38  52.74  86.73  50.20  50.55 
𝜽 median  0.6292  0.5748  0.6384  0.6305  0.5947  0.595 
a , dependent variable is the growth rate of real GDP  
b , all regressions include a constant term (White-corrected standard errors  in parentheses); ***,  Significant at the 1% level; **,  Significant at the 5% level; *,  Significant at the 
10% level 
 
Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 080Table 6.Variable Description and Data Sources 
Name  Description  Source 
Study  Data from EVS (1), WVS (2) or LITS (3)  European and World Values Survey, Life in 
Transition Survey 
Wave  1 – 1981 to 1984 
2  - 1989 to 1993 
3 – 1994 to 1999 
4 – 1999 to 2004 
5 – 2005 to 2009 
EVS/WVS; LITS 




Price Level of Investment Good relative 
to the United States 
Penn World Tables, version 6.3 
Openness  Openness of the economy (Exports and 
Imports divided by GDP) 
Penn World Tables, version 6.3 
Investment 
in GDP 
Share of Investment in GDP  Penn World Tables, version 6.3 
Area  Area in 1000 km²  Penn World Tables, version 6.3 
Population  Size of Population  World Development Indicators 
Rural 
Population 
Rural Population in % of total Population  World Development Indicators 
Labor Force  Size of Labor Force  World Development Indicators 
Life 
Expectancy 
Life expectancy in years  World Development Indicators 
Agriculture  Share of agriculture in value added  World Development Indicators 
Industry  Share of Industry in value added  World Development Indicators 
Military  Military expenditures as percentage of 
the GDP 
World Development Indicators 
High-Tech  High-tech exports as percentage of total 
exports 
World Development Indicators 
Inflation  Average Inflation  World Development Indicators 
Energy  Energy Use in tons of oil equivalent  World Development Indicators 
Assistance  Average official development assistance 
and official aid in current US $ 
World Development Indicators 
Fuel  Fuel Exports as % of Total Exports  World Development Indicators 
Ores and 
metals 
Ore and Metal exports as % of total 
exports 
World Development Indicators 
Interest Rate  Real Interest Rate  Global Finance Development 
Interest 
Payment 
Interest Payment as percentage of 
expenses 
Global Finance Development 
Debt Service  Total debt service in % of GNI  Global Finance Development 
Exchange 
Rate 
Average growth of real exchange to the 
US $ over observation period 
Historical Data Files of the International 
Macroeconomic Data Set 
External 
Wealth 
Total Assets less total Debt  External Wealth of Nations Mark II 
Labor 
Productivity 
Labor productivity per hour worked in 
1990 US $ 
Total Economy Database 





Labor productivity per person engaged in 
1990 US $ 
Total Economy Database 
Stability  Number of years since the most recent 
policy change (as denoted by the variable 
“durable”) before the observation period 
Polity IV: Regime Authority Characteristics 
and Transitions Datasets 
Break  Dummy for a policy change to have 
occurred during the observation period 
Polity IV: Regime Authority Characteristics 
and Transitions Datasets 
Polity IV  Democracy score (as denoted by the 
variable “Polity2”) 
Polity IV: Regime Authority Characteristics 
and Transitions Datasets 
Pre-War  Intensity of any armed conflict that 
appeared up to 15 years prior to the 
observation. 
0 – No armed conflict 
1 – Minor armed Conflict (between 25 
and 999 battle-related deaths) 
2 – War (more than 1000 battle-related 
deaths) 
UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, version 
4-2009 
In War  Intensity of armed conflict during 
observation period (see Pre-War) 
UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, version 
4-2009 
Fearon  Ethnic Fractionalization (time-invariant)  Fearon (2003) 
Ethnic  Ethnic Fractionalization (changing)  Fearon (2003), Roeder (2001), CIA World 
Factbook 
Schooling  Average years of schooling in total 
population, prior to observation 
Barro and Lee (1993) 
Primary  Primary School enrollment rate (gross) 10 
years prior to the observation window 
UNESCO Statistical Yearbook/ Education 
Digest, various issues 
Secondary  Secondary School enrollment rate (gross)  
5 years prior to the observation window 
UNESCO Statistical Yearbook/ Education 
Digest, various issues 
Tertiary  Tertiary School enrollment rate (gross)  5 
years prior to the observation window 
UNESCO Statistical Yearbook/ Education 
Digest, various issues 





Under communist rule prior to the 
observation period but any time between 




Access to international waters  CIA World Factbook 
Latitude  Average latitude of the country 
(deviations from the equator positive) 
 
OPEC  Member of the OPEC   
EU  Member of the European Union , the 





Member of the Commonwealth of 
Nations/ former British Colony 
http://www.commonwealth-of-
nations.org/Member_Countries-
Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 080Brief_Intro,38,30,1 
Developing 
Country 
World Bank Classification in Low, Middle 
and High income countries 
The World Bank 
Buddhist  Fraction of Buddhists in Population  Sala-i-Martin (1997); CIA World Factbook; 
Teorell, Charron, Samanni, Holmberg, & 
Rothstein (2009) 
Catholic  Fraction of Catholics in Population  Sala-i-Martin (1997); CIA World Factbook; 
Teorell, Charron, Samanni, Holmberg, & 
Rothstein (2009) 
Confucian  Fraction of Confucians in Population  Sala-i-Martin (1997); CIA World Factbook; 
Teorell, Charron, Samanni, Holmberg, & 
Rothstein (2009) 
Hindu  Fraction of Hindu in Population  Sala-i-Martin (1997); CIA World Factbook; 
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